Abstract
Illustrations

Preface
The process of weapon systems acquisition in the Air Force will never be an artless or simple process. Just as a commander and his staff would be developing a method of attack prior to battle, a program manager with his contracting officer and staff needs to perform acquisition planning prior to release of the contract's Request For Proposal (RFP). Acquiring a weapon system is somewhat methodical due to federal and service guidelines. In addition to the methodical process dictated by regulatory guidance there is the acquisition reform climate a team must operate in. Innovation, creativity, and assessing risk must take place in order to meet the demands of budget constraints, manpower reductions and most of all product/service delivery.
As an Air Force contracting officer, I've been involved with the early stages of acquisition planning necessary to determine strategy and the path to success. While assigned to the Electronic Systems Center (ESC) 
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The role of the contracting officer (CO) in the acquisition process is significant because it is solely this individual who has the ability to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts. Key in the CO's mind is safeguarding the interests of the United States as referenced in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 1.602-2. One way of safeguarding those interests is ensuring a sound business strategy is reached prior to release of the program's RFP. One business strategy a CO may pursue is Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR). Essentially, TSPR fosters an environment for the government and contractor team to gain efficiencies by identifying redundant and/or unnecessary practices, eliminating those practices, and using commercial practices to replace or enhance the acquisition process. TSPR dictates the government take a step back and give the contractor greater freedom to be innovative in its management practices without the traditional level of government oversight. This paper provides an answer to the following question: -Is the TSPR approach responding to the Air Force's expectations as dictated by the acquisition reform climate?" Upon reviewing four Air Force weapon system programs, TSPR clearly responded to those expectations, but it does not guarantee a problem free acquisition by virtue of a shift in responsibility. In the case of one program, TSPR did not guarantee on schedule delivery of a weapon system. What is common among the four programs profiled is the recognition that TSPR provided a fresh environment suitable to gain efficiencies and an attitude geared for nothing short of success.
vii
Introduction
We expect to achieve greater successes from every person, dollar, and hour we expend to acquire and sustain our current and new weapon systems.
-Darleen Druyun, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and Management
The quest for the perfect acquisition is synonymous with a field commander's quest for the decisive plan prior to battle. The field commander develops his plan after the military objective is clearly defined and communicated. Likewise, the program manager (PM) leads the development of the acquisition plan once approval to begin a new acquisition program is granted as a result of concept exploration. In support of the PM, the contracting officer (CO) should be thinking about the business strategy to be used in support of the program's vision and goal. The PM and CO have no shortage of guidance to adhere to from system program office (SPO) leadership, the Program Executive Officer (PEO) office and legal. Moreover, today the environment is influenced by the Air Force's Lightning Bolt initiatives that emphasize commercial practices to capture savings, and the Year 2000 DoD Acquisition Goals that place an emphasis on process improvement and realizing efficiencies. Ultimately the team must ensure a sound acquisition strategy is in place that is tailored to the unique needs of the weapon system. This paper will look at one acquisition approach being used in weapons systems contracts known as Total System Performance Responsibility or TSPR. The TSPR approach is commonly known and utilized by the acquisition community supporting the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) because of their emphasis on weapon system development. One major portion of AFMC's mission is to manage the integrated research, development, test, acquisition, and sustainment of weapon systems. 1 All four programs being profiled in this paper belong to SPOs that reside within AFMC and support customers outside of AFMC. The AF focus of this paper does not imply that the TSPR approach is not used in other Department of Defense departments/agencies.
Acquisition professionals consistently receive messages to make the next acquisition better than the last acquisition and to apply lessons learned. Why is this? The bottom line answer is because we owe it to the taxpayers to spend wisely and we owe it to the warfighter to deliver a mission-ready and capable product on time.
-Faster", -smarter", -stay within budget and on-schedule"…these words often resound in a PM's and CO's ears as they prepare to embark on a new acquisition or take over an existing weapon system program. Since the 1990s, acquisition reform has resulted not only in written guidance to acquisition professionals, but also in creating a mindset and attitude to avoid the -business as usual" approach. We cannot afford to go back to the early days of acquisition as described in this harsh but realistic view of then AF Chief of Staff General Merrill A. McPeak, -The acquisition system is much closer to failure…the fact that military procurement provides steady work for more than 25,000 auditors is compelling evidence of a widespread skepticism about the defense acquisition process." 2 The TSPR approach addresses Gen McPeak's assessment of acquisition and seeks to help turn -failures" into successes.
After reviewing the C-17, F-117, ICBM and SBIRS programs, I will provide an answer to the question: -Is the TSPR approach responding to the Air Force's expectations as dictated by the acquisition reform climate?"
In Chapter 2, I will focus on the definition of TSPR and determine its intent. Chapter 3 will look at TSPR's role in different weapon systems and include legal opinions on its use. Finally, in Chapter 4 I will provide a conclusion and recommendation, answering the question posed in this paper.
The sources for this paper included refereed journals, professional magazines/periodicals, the Internet, and surveys. I developed the surveys and then sent them to SPOs associated with the above-mentioned programs which are using the TSPR approach. The surveys were sent to each SPO's contracting office to allow for the CO to be the focal point and link to the respective government PM and contractor.
Additionally, surveys were sent to contracting staff and legal offices. the Integrated Logistics System (Supply) at Gunter AFB, AL indicates the purpose of TSPR -…would seem to be to simplify the management structure for the acquisition of an information weapon system for the total performance of the system to a single management entity, thus simplifying the management structure and accountability for cost, schedule, and technical performance of the system." He further states, -The net result of this simplification would seem to be a reduction in acquisition oversight that might otherwise be required to manage the integration of multiple entities..." 7 The Chief of the Contract Policy Division at HQ AFMC views TSPR as -an acquisition strategy to have a single contractor manage the integration of all sub elements of a system to ensure that the entire system meets performance requirements" and -how the contractor meets the broad performance requirement is at their general discretion." 8 After reviewing a few of the TSPR definitions in the field, common denominators mentioned earlier again become apparent-improve the quality of product or service, reduce costs, gain efficiencies, and minimize government oversight.
TSPR's Place in Acquisition Reform
TSPR is an acquisition approach that responds to the government and industry's recognition of change needed in government procurement. In 1997, the president and It is evident that industry wants more freedom to manage the delivery of a product or service and welcomes performance-based requirements. Likewise, DoD has set guidance for agencies to create more performance-based requirements wherever possible in order to gain innovation, savings and overall efficiencies. Unquestionably, TSPR shifts a specified amount of responsibility traditionally held by the government to the contractor-for some SPOs this shift is a huge change in process and culture. Therefore, it is imperative prior to the inclusion of a TSPR approach in an acquisition plan that the government includes this transfer of responsibility in the program's risk assessment. This risk assessment is the process of subjectively determining the probability that a specific interplay of performance, schedule, and cost as an objective will or will not be attained along the planned course of action. 15 Assessing the risk starts with the formation of a risk assessment group consisting of the PM, CO, engineers, acquisition development staff and customer. If after careful review the group's assessment concludes the benefits of implementing TSPR outweigh the traditional methods of government oversight, then and only then should a PM give the -green light" to proceed with this approach. If the decision is to implement TSPR then one of two scenarios will likely be the outcome of the contract. It may play out like this on the -Who Takes the Blame/Credit" spectrum.
On one end is scenario one: After receiving a phone call from the Terminating Contracting Officer for -XX" weapon system, the contractor grudgingly says, -We may have overlooked the complexities and that explains why the government reverted back to the oversight mode…not to mention we never got the resources we were promised."
However, if all the necessary factors are in place then the TSPR approach is intended to play out as in scenario two: Upon successful delivery of -XX" weapon system, the contractor assuredly says, -We delivered on schedule and within budget because we had the latitude to manage development, the government gave us the resources, and we had a solid requirement." 
TSPR Is Put To The Test In The Field
All business proceeds on beliefs, or judgments of probabilities, and not certainties.
-Charles Williams Eliot
The TSPR approach, with its common theme of delivering the required product or service to the customer in a more efficient and cost-saving manner, is alive and well in the AF. In order to determine how TSPR is doing in the field, four SPOs will be profiled to see how TSPR has affected each respective program. When TSPR is placed in a contract clause it normally will state specifically what the contractor is being held responsible for (i.e. research, development, integration, or sustainment of systems/subsystems). The government takes the lead when determining the responsibilities to be transferred to the contractor.
As mentioned earlier, a TSPR survey was used because it was the best method to obtain the most meaningful and current feedback. Under the F-117 contract, Lockheed Martin took responsibility for tasks historically performed by the Air Force (e.g. item management). 10 According to the F-117 CO, -Our goal in pursuing this TSPR philosophy was to continue sustainment and support of the F-117 weapon system at a lower total cost to the Air Force (including SPO manpower), while providing the same or better level of support to the user (ACC)." 11 Inclusion of the TSPR philosophy allowed for significant changes from the way weapon systems support is usually conducted at Air Logistics Centers. Under the TSPR concept, management of the F-117 repair-cycle assets transferred to Lockheed Martin in order to improve asset availability. -We believe Lockheed Martin's market focus will help gain control of the repair cycle and drastically reduce cycle time." 12 The mandatory relocation of the SPO and the directive to implement Reduction in Total Ownership Cost set the stage for the TSPR approach to flourish and take the F-117 out of the -business as usual" approach.
The PM states, "The TSPR contract will provide depot-level acquisition and sustainment requirements necessary to support the mission, operation and continued combat capabilities of the F-117 weapon system into the next decade." Lockheed and the SPO were both up-front in letting the fact be known that there are lessons to be learned since the TSPR concept was conceived. For instance there was the need for multiple Acquisition Strategy Panels (ASPs) to convince senior leadership the TSPR business approach was sound, to address job-security of government employees affected by the reorganization, and to ensure contract incentives were sufficient to properly motivate the contractor. Without the approval of the acquisition plan by senior contracting officials at the ASP, the acquisition does not move forward.
So how is the contract doing thus far? According to the PM, -The contractor has met the performance level in the first two years, under run cost the first two years by about $18M, and the government has not had to revert back to any government oversight…the only drawback I see is we lost experienced government folks and our ability to interpret the contract in a few vague areas has caused us some additional workload." 16 When asked if both the government and Lockheed Martin favored TSPR in government contracts, both had similar comments. The PM stated TSPR -...is a great way for the government to reduce costs while providing the warfighter with as good or better support." 17 Lockheed added a tone of caution. As a result of TSPR, -the aircraft has higher performance ratings and the customer is happier than it has ever been" and -…the figures speak for themselves: $82M in personnel cost savings, $80M in stabilized funding and almost $20M in shared cost under run for the first two years." 18 The caution
Lockheed states is that the -F-117 TSPR is not a contract that should be used as a template for the next TSPR contract." 19 Each acquisition team will have to determine what expected benefits they want from TSPR and then tailor it accordingly to meet their particular needs. Consequently, the program office must work closely with TRW in identifying, addressing, and negating risks because ignoring risks is unacceptable to the customer.
ICBM System Program Office
TSPR does put the -monkey" on the contractor's back to manage delivery of the system, but the government still has to be there to oversee the program. The PM states, -The contractor may be responsible for delivering a system that meets the performance, but it is the government program office that is ultimately responsible for meeting warfighter requirements. Thus, both the contractor and government teams have to work together to resolve any risks that could impact the warfighter's requirements." 27 The teaming effort noted by the PM is benefiting TRW. TRW stated they are doing an excellent job of fulfilling their responsibility -…as demonstrated by a 100% award fee score for our sustainment effort in the last award fee period." space-based system that in time will meet the United States' infrared global surveillance needs through the next several decades. 31 The SBIRS program will replace the 30-year old Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites that watch the earth for the telltale heat signatures of ICBM launches. 32 The focus here will be on the SBIRS High contract with Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company. The contract is a performance-based contract that has the TSPR clause in Section H of the contract. The SBIRS contract responds to the 1994 DoD military specifications memorandum since SBIRS has -no military standards or specifications used to define supportability engineering requirements…" 33 Furthermore, the contract is in step with the April 2000 Performance-Based Services Acquisition memorandum since -all documented supportability engineering requirements are performance-based statements reflecting a need rather than a solution." 34 The transfer of responsibility is clearly defined in the TSPR clause; -…the contractor agrees to assume TSPR in accordance with the terms and performance requirements of this contract, and to furnish all necessary effort, skills, and expertise within the estimated cost and award fee pool of this contract." 35 The properly execute a program is a significant task in itself for the PM and financial staff.
Hence, a CO actually receiving an approved funding document to keep the contract moving is a significant event. The SBIRS TSPR clause language lets both parties know that TSPR performance is dictated by available funding the government has to provide.
Today's limited dollars for DoD acquisition will continue to be a challenge for the foreseeable future.
The expectations of TSPR by the SBIRS High PM and the Lockheed Martin
Contract Administrator are very similar to the previously addressed programs. The PM stated -…the desired outcome should be allowing the contractor flexibility…" and the -…government taking the insight and facilitator roles more strongly and the removal of direct government oversight and inter-agency coordination." 36 As the party that has been given TSPR, the contractor has translated the government's expectations into their own vision for SBIRS High development. A few of the benefits being sought by Lockheed
Martin as a result of putting TSPR in the contract are: achieving system performance rather than unintegrated or difficult to integrate elements, reducing costs from more efficient contractor processes, less duplication of and more collaboration on functions between government and contractor, and greater sharing of risk passed to the contractor in the areas of design and integration. 37 Throughout Lockheed Martin's survey, key points such as relative freedom, opportunity and efficiency were mentioned-all common denominators of TSPR.
So how is the contract doing thus far? According to the PM -…TSPR has been successful in allowing the contractor to determine approaches for interfacing…"
however, it has -…not shown to be successful in meeting acquisition program baseline parameters for delivery of the first increment consisting of a DSP compatible, 
Contract Law Comments
An integral member of any acquisition team is the legal expert(s) from the Staff Judge Advocate's Office. A legal review of the contract document and its file is a mandatory requirement that takes place prior to executing a large-dollar contract.
Furthermore, most experienced acquisition teams will always invite the legal office when forming their acquisition strategy. Legal offices at Eglin AFB and Hanscom AFB were sent surveys in order to determine what cautions and concerns exist based on their contract law experiences.
Getting the language right in a TSPR clause is paramount because of the transferring of specific responsibilities from the government to the contractor. Establishing agreeable language is critical because the language sets the standards and guidelines for the contractor's acceptance of development, integration, or sustainment responsibility.
Conversely, the language defines the parameters for which the government will provide the oversight and resources necessary for the contractor to meet the performance based requirement. An attorney at Hanscom AFB states, -…the biggest problem is getting the language right. The government wants the contractor to assume all the risk for everything, while the contractor wants to avoid as much of the risk as possible. In the end, the language is a compromise between these two extremes." 
Conclusion and Recommendation
The entire planning process is only useful if leaders at all levels know the end-state. In contrast to IPIC and SBIRS, the C-17 Flexible Sustainment and F-117 contracts operate with the TSPR label, but without a TSPR clause in the contract. In these programs, both the government and contractor rely on the TSPR -spirit" or -buy in" to define their working relationship and determine how the program will be executed.
Despite the lack of a TSPR clause, both programs are doing quite well thus far.
However, not having a TSPR clause leaves the possibility of future disagreements on responsibility-related issues. The CO needs to have language in the contract he can refer to if he is going to properly administer the contract, especially if scope-of-work issues arise between both parties. Personnel turnover and resulting loss of corporate history is a common source of conflict. Furthermore, changes in the needs of the user and the subsequent changes in design, production or sustainment needs can lead to time-consuming conflict without a TSPR clause. The safest means to avoid conflict with TSPR is to put it in writing and avoid relying on the TSPR -spirit" living on past personnel changes or forgetful minds.
Acquiring the freedom and flexibility to manage a program is something most contractors have longed for. Once it gives a contractor TSPR, the government should proceed on the assumption that the contractor has the managerial ingenuity and technical expertise to deliver the product/service with minimal government oversight. The government's expectations become explicit once TSPR is included in the program since -In theory, the more responsibility the government can turn over to a contractor under a TSPR strategy the greater the potential benefits." 3 The TSPR approach is here to stay for the foreseeable future. The General Accounting Office (GAO) -…identifies 44 programs currently managed with a TSPR agreement" and -…lists 31 programs planned for TSPR." 4 The Air Force reported to
Congress that three of the four programs (F-117, C-17 and ICBM) profiled in this paper are being managed with TSPR. When appropriate, COs in future programs should tailor a TSPR clause to meet the program's needs and place it in the contract to minimize the possibility of disagreements later in the program. As the program matures, the clause acts as a baseline and important placeholder that does more than set the tone for the execution of the program. If it makes sense to transfer responsibilities from the government to the contractor then TSPR can and has proven to work. Given the right requirement, it is one acquisition approach that will help the SPO team get the very best product or service to the warfighter.
